Social Control of Wealth in Antebellum New York by LaPiana, William P.
digitalcommons.nyls.edu
Faculty Scholarship Articles & Chapters
2017
Social Control of Wealth in Antebellum New York
William P. LaPiana
New York Law School, william.lapiana@nyls.edu
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.nyls.edu/fac_articles_chapters
Part of the Estates and Trusts Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at DigitalCommons@NYLS. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Articles & Chapters by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@NYLS.
Recommended Citation
ACTEC Law Journal, Vol. 42, Issue 3 (Winter 2017), pp. 279-310
Social Control of Wealth in Antebellum New York
William P. LaPiana*
I. INTRODUCTION
Trusts are often portrayed as the quintessential invention of the
common law legal world, born of lawyerly and judicial ingenuity in the
service of clients' desires to frustrate taxation by first fashioning and
then discharging a rocket launcher through a loophole in a statute care-
fully designed end to put an end to existing tax evasion.' More broadly,
the conventional history of the trust most often portrays it as a device
for the perpetuation of individual control over wealth in opposition both
to governmental attempts to limit that control through taxation and to
attempts by family members to control the use of inherited wealth.2 The
two great nineteenth century innovations in American trust law, the
spendthrift trust and the formal rule that a trust cannot be terminated
by the consent of all the beneficiaries if to do so would subvert a "mate-
rial purpose" for the settlor's creation of the trust, were both premised
on the idea that the settlor has every right to control the enjoyment of
the property the settlor has placed in trust for the benefit of the benefi-
ciaries.3 Those two particular manifestations of the idea that the intent
of the settlor controls are the products of the 1880s, yet their viability is
undiminished today.
That continuing strength has manifested itself in many of the dis-
cussions of whether or not a particular state should adopt the Uniform
Trust Code, promulgated by the Uniform Law Commission and offered
* William P. LaPiana is the Rita and Joseph Solomon Professor of Wills, Trusts, and
Estates and the Director of Estate Planning, Graduate Tax Program at New York Law
School, where he also serves as Associate Dean of Academic Affairs. Professor LaPiana
is an ACTEC Academic Fellow.
1 This view of the trust informs the conventional understanding of the workings of
the Statute of Uses, 27 Hen. 8 ch. 10, which sees the statute's enactment as part of Henry
VIII's campaign to shore up the Crown's revenue from feudal incidents, an aim frus-
trated by the subsequent invention of the trust. See CORNELIUS J. MOYNIHAN & SHEL-
DON F. KURTZ, INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY 222 (3d ed. 2002).
2 See, e.g., Joshua C. Tate, Conditional Love: Incentive Trusts and the Inflexibility
Problem, 41 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 445, 445-48 (2006) (discussing how trusts are
often used to control the spending of children of wealthy families or provide incentives to
effect particular behaviors or particular uses for the wealth).
3 See Broadway Nat'l. Bk. v. Adams, 133 Mass. 170, 173 (1882) (employing the
concept of a spendthrift trust); Claflin v. Claflin, 149 Mass. 19, 455-56 (1889) (employing
the material purpose rule).
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for adoption in the states. Under its former name, the National Confer-
ence of Commissions on Uniform State Laws, the Commission was the
author of the Uniform Commercial Code, its most successful effort at
bringing uniformity to the laws of the states, and the Uniform Probate
Code, its somewhat less successful but nonetheless influential attempt to
do the same for the law of wills and probate procedure. The Uniform
Trust Code has been adopted in 30 states and the District of Columbia
since was promulgated in 2000 (although it has been amended several
times).4 The UTC's spendthrift trust provisions (sections 502-503) are a
codification of existing law and its provision dealing with termination of
a trust with the consent of all of the beneficiaries (section 411) requires
that the termination not be "inconsistent with a material purpose of the
trust" and expressly states that the existence of a spendthrift provision is
not presumed to express a material purpose. The Comment to section
411 quotes from Restatement (Third) of Trusts section 65, comment d to
the effect that material purposes "are not readily inferred." The com-
ment to the termination provision, and by extension the Restatement
provision, has been widely criticized as not giving sufficient deference to
the settlor's reasons for creating the trust and the provision removing
the presumption that the existence of spendthrift provision is not
enough to prevent termination, that is, that its inclusion in the trust
terms expresses a "material purpose," has been so widely scorned that
the Commission has placed the provision in brackets, indicating that a
state can omit the provision and still adopt the "Uniform Trust Code." 5
There is, however, an alternative American trust law, traces of
which still exist in the law of its place of origin, New York State. The
trust provisions of the Revised Statutes of 1830 were a radical transfor-
mation of the law of trusts as it then existed in the Anglo-American
legal world.6 The Revised Statutes as a whole and the story of their
adoption has not received a thorough treatment in many decades, and
4 The Nat'l Conf. of Comm'rs on Unif. State Laws, Trust Code, UNF. LAW
COMM'N, http://uniformlaws.org/Act.aspx?title=trust%20Code (last visited July 3, 2017).
5 There is a large amount of literature on both the spendthrift and the trust modifi-
cations provision of the U.T.C. See, e.g., Kevin D. Millard, Rights of a Trust Beneficiary's
Creditors Under the Uniform Trust Code, 34 ACTEC J. 58 (2008); Alan Newman, The
Intention of the Settlor Under the Uniform Trust Code: Whose Property is it Anyway?, 38
AKRON L. REV. 649 (2005); Alan Newman, Spendthrift and Discretionary Trusts Under
the Uniform Trust Code, 40 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 567 (2005); Alan Newman, The
Rights of Creditors of Beneficiaries Under the Uniform Trust Code: An Examination of
the Compromise, 69 TENN. L. REV. 771 (2002); see also Gail Boreman Bird, Trust Termi-
nation: Unborn, Living and Dead Hands-Too Many Fingers in the Trust Pie, 36 HAS-
TINGs L.J. 563 (1985).
6 The portions of the Revised Statutes dealing with the law of real property which
are the provisions dealt with here, were enacted in 1827 and 1828 with an effective date
of January 1, 1830. See N.Y. Revised Stat. § 8 (1830) [hereinafter R.S.]. The Revised
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this paper certainly is not an attempt to fill that gap. Rather, it illus-
trates the radical nature of the trust provisions of the Revised Statutes
by examining the first case to apply them to a will contest. Some back-
ground, however, is still necessary.
II. THE REVISED STATUTES
In 1828 and 1829 the legislature enacted the Revised Statutes which
had been prepared by a committee of three appointed by legislative act
in 1824.7 The work undertaken was much more than systematization
and reordering of existing statutes. The revisers, Benjamin Butler, John
Duer, and John C. Spencer, submitted to the legislature an extensive
revision of the law of New York which one commentator describes as
"the first true revision of statute law among English speaking peoples." 8
Some of the most dramatic changes were made in the law of real prop-
erty. Many of these involved the complexities surrounding uses and
their role in conveyancing. Others completely transformed the law of
trusts of real property and it is those provisions examined here.
The trust provisions of the Revised Statutes are easy to summarize,
although they proved difficult to put into practice. There are only two
types of trust. The first class includes trusts arising by implication of law
which are necessary to prevent fraud. The classic example is A provides
money to B which is to be used to purchase real property. B does
purchase the property but takes title in B's name without A's knowledge
or consent or in violation of A's legitimate expectations. An implied
trust therefore arises which requires B to convey title to A. The second
class includes active or express trusts "where the trustee is clothed with
some actual power of disposition or management, which cannot be
properly exercised without giving him the legal estate and actual posses-
sion." 9 The statute then authorized only four types of express trusts: 1)
to sell lands for the benefit of creditors, 2) to sell, mortgage or lease
lands to raise cash to satisfy legacies in wills, 3) to receive the rents and
profits from lands "and apply them to the use of any person," and 4) or
to accumulate the rents and profits for eventual application to the use of
any person.' 0 The third sort of trust is closest to what today we identify
with the idea of a trust; that is, a trust set up by one person for the
benefit of another person. The object of the arrangement is to entrust
Statutes are therefore usually referred to as the Revised Statutes of 1830; that convention
will be followed here.
7 1825 N.Y. LAWS. ch 324 (1909).
8 Ernest H. Breuer, The New York Revised Statutes-1829, 55 L. LIBRARY J. 33, 33-
34 (1962).
9 4 JAMEs KENr, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAw 309 (4th ed. 1840).
10 R.S. § 55.
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the trustee with the management of property for the benefit of the bene-
ficiary. It is a gift, often made at death, and often made by one member
of a couple to the survivor or by an older generation member to rela-
tives of a younger generation.
The limitation of these provisions to trusts of lands, of course, does
not make sense in the twenty-first century. Today most private express
trusts are invested in financial assets. For the revisers, however, it was
land that was the source of wealth that provided a stream of income for
beneficiaries of trusts." In addition, the revisers believed that the ex-
isting law of trusts was particularly pernicious as applied to trusts of real
property. 12 The law allowed the creation of what were called "formal"
trusts. These trusts gave legal title to the land to the trustee but gave the
beneficiaries of the trust total control over the land. It was thus possible
to hide the real ownership of land behind the person of the trustee. Not
only did this arrangement cause confusion in the records of title to land,
but it created opportunities for deception and bedeviled the courts of
equity with litigation to sort out the resulting tangles. As the Revisers
themselves put it in their Notes to the statutes they proposed to the
legislature,
[I]t is plainly needless to retain them ["formal trusts"]. They
separate the legal and equitable estate, for no purpose that the
law ought to sanction. They answer no end whatever, but to
facilitate fraud; the render titles more complicated, and to in-
crease the business of the court of chancery. They are, in truth,
precisely what uses were before the statute of uses, and are liable
to many of the same objections.1 3
While not mentioned in the Revisers' Notes, one example of the
questionable use of trusts had already been addressed by legislation. It
appears that while most property qualifications for voting were part of
the New York Constitution prior to the adoption of the Constitution of
1821 (complete abolition required some additional legislation), the prac-
tice of temporarily enfranchising voters by transferring to them for a
very short period of time sufficient freehold land to meet the require-
ments was a common practice.1 4 Known in England as "fagot holdings,"
11 The situation in contemporary Boston, for example, may have been different. See
Lawrence M. Friedman, The Dynastic Trust, 73 YALE L.J. 547, 554 (1964).
12 CHARLES M. COOK, AMERICAN CODIFICATION MOVEMENT: A STUDY OF ANTE-
mioM LEGAL. REFORM (1981).
13 NoTrES OF THE ORIGINAL REVISERS oF Tim REVISED STATUTEs, reprinted in
RoBERTr LuDow Fowi.IR, Timi- REAL PRoPERTY LAW OF TiuE SrATI OF NHw YORK
1293 (Baker, Voorhis & Co. 3d ed. 1909).
14 DIXoN RYAN Fox, Tiim DECLINE OF ARISTOCRACY IN THE PoLIrICS OF NEw
YORK 144 (1918).
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the practice was perceived to be common enough in New York to be
addressed by legislation, prescribing a new oath to be taken by electors
who must swear that they possess a freehold of sufficient value and
"that I have not become such freeholder fraudulently, for the purpose of
giving my vote at this election, nor upon any trust or understanding,
express or implied, to reconvey such freehold during or after this
election."' 5
In short, the Revisers meant what they said in section 45 of Article
II, "Of Uses and Trusts": "Uses and trusts, except as authorised and
modified in this Article, are abolished . ... "
A. Perpetuities
The revisers took an even more radical approach to another aspect
of the law of trusts, limiting the control of the dead hand. Today, almost
every law student learns to dread the very phrase "rule against perpetu-
ities," and the rule's gradual abolition in this country is probably a
source of satisfaction to many who have struggled with its complexities.
The rule against perpetuities that is taught in the classroom today is a
rule based on remoteness of vesting of future interests. 16 A future inter-
est, of course, is property. It can be analogized to a claim check. At
some time in the future, a person who has the claim check can surrender
it in return for the ownership of property. All trusts create future inter-
ests. There are current beneficiaries and those who will benefit in the
future. The latter have future interests and in order for those interests
to be valid they must "vest in interest" within a period that begins to run
when the future interest is created and lasts for the length of a life or
lives in being when the interest is created plus twenty-one years plus a
period of gestation. A future interest is vested in interest when the per-
son who has the interest can be identified and the quantity of property
that will be received when the future interest turns into possession is
certain.' 7 The classic example is a trust to pay the income to the creator
of the trust's child for life, then to pay the income to the child's children
for their lives, then to terminate the trust and to distribute the trust
property to the child's then living descendants. The child's children
15 1811 N.Y. L. 287 (intending to prevent frauds and perjuries at elections and to
prevent slaves from voting).
16 Before too long the Rule Against Perpetuities may be an historical curiosity. It
has been abolished in as many as 20 states and the "dynastic" trust, a trust for a family
line drafted to be perpetual, or at least of many centuries duration, is now a staple of
estate planning for the wealthy. See LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, DEAD HANos: A SocIAr.
HISTORY oiF W1.is, TiUIST, AND INHERITANCEI LAw 132-136 (2009).
17 WILLIAM M. McGOVERN, SHELDON F. KuRTZ & DAvID M. ENGLISHl, Wrs,
TRUSTS AND EsTAITS, INCLUDING TAXATION AND FUTUiRE INTIERESTs 491 (4th ed.
2010).
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have future interests in the trust income, and all of those children will be
known at the child's death and the share of income to which they will be
entitled will also be known. The future interest, which when it is
"cashed in" will result in obtaining fee simple ownership of the trust
property, however, is created in the child's descendants who are living at
the death of the last to die of the child's children, and it will not be
certain who will receive the trust property nor how much each person
will receive until that future date. Because the child can have more chil-
dren after the trust is created, the time for the termination of the trust
could be the death of a person who was not alive when the trust was
created. Thus the persons who will receive the trust property might be
determined at the death of a person who was not a life in being and
therefore the interest in the child's descendants is void ab initio.18
It is worth repeating that the income interests in the hypothetical
trust discussed above are perfectly valid under the "no remoteness of
vesting" rule. The child's interest in the income vests at the creation of
the trust; the child's children's interests vest when the child dies and no
more children can come in to being; the class is "closed" at that time, a
time which occurs at the death of the child who was him or herself a life
in being when the trust was created. 19 Because the Rule Against Perpe-
tuities invalidates only the remainder, the trust will be established and
will pay income to child and child's children just as the trust terms re-
quire. When the last of child's children die the trust will terminate and
the trust property will most likely be distributed through the estate of
the creator of the trust.2 0 For example, if the trust was created in the
will of child's parent from the residuary probate estate, the interest rep-
resenting the right to have possession of the trust property when the
trust finally ends must go to parent's intestate heirs-property not prop-
erly disposed of by will must pass in intestacy. Determining who actu-
ally gets possession of the property at the termination of the trust will
certainly require tracing that reversionary interest through several inter-
mediate estates until the ultimate takers of the property are properly
identified.
18 Id. at 492.
19 In the modern world, the notion that the class of a child's own children closes at
child's death is obsolete. The technology of storing sperm and ova makes it possible for
an individual's child to be conceived and born after the individual's death. The status of
such children is generally uncertain and while there are numerous reported cases involv-
ing claims for Social Security benefits on behalf of such children as the survivors of their
"predeceased" parent or parents, there appear to be no cases involving perpetuities is-
sues. A handful of states have legislation dealing with the status of posthumously con-
ceived children for property law purposes like inheritance. See N.Y. EsTr. PowERS &
TRUSTs LAW § 4-1.3 (McKinney 2017).
20 McGOVERN, KuRTZ & ENGLISH, supra note 17, at 492.
[Vol. 42:279284
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The revisers, however, took a different approach. They ignored
vesting and focused instead on the suspension of the power of aliena-
tion. The rule was set forth in two sections of Part II, Chapter I, Article
1:21
Section 14. Every future estate shall be void in its creation,
which shall suspend the absolute power of alienation for a
longer period than is prescribed in this Article. Such power of
alienation is suspended, when there are no persons in being, by
whom an absolute fee in possession can be conveyed.
Section 15. The absolute power of alienation, shall not be sus-
pended by any limitation or condition whatever for a longer
period than during the continuance of not more than two lives
in being at the creation of the estate ....
The limitation to two lives was an innovation, directly inspired by Thel-
lusson's Case,22 in which the English courts allowed accumulation of in-
come and the postponement of vesting during the lives of nine persons
living at the testator's death.2 3 The question left open by the drafting of
section 14 is the meaning of "future estate." In the example above does
the term apply only to the ultimate remainder, or does it mean the in-
come interests as well? That is a question that the first case to deal with
these provisions would answer.
B. Indestructibility
But there is more. The third type of permitted trust described
above, corresponding most closely to modern donative express trusts,
were made indestructible by section 63:24 the right of the beneficiary of
such a trust to the rents and profits of the real property in the trust
"cannot be transferred by assignment or otherwise."
In addition, section 65 states, "where the trust shall be expressed in
the instrument creating the estate, every sale, conveyance or other act of
the trustees, in contravention of the trust, shall be absolutely void."
Taken together, these two provisions are the source of the "statutory
spendthrift trust," one of the distinguishing features of New York trust
21 R.S. §§ 14, 15.
22 Thellusson's Case (1805), 32 Eng. Rep. 1030; 11 Vesey 112; JOHN F. HARGRAVE,
A TREATISE ON THE THELLUSSON ACr, 39 & 40 GEO. III. c. 98: WITH PRACTICAL OB-
SERVATIONS UPON TRUSTS FOR ACCUMULATION (1842).
23 Parliament reacted to the result by passing the Accumulations Act, 40 Geo. III (c.
98). See HARGRAVE, supra note 22, at xviii.
24 R.S. § 63.
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law. 2 5 In addition, the prohibition on the trustees doing anything that
contravenes the terms of the trust is the provision which has made New
York trusts indestructible, no matter what the beneficiaries might desire.
C. Supplanting the Common Law
These provisions are indeed revolutionary. James Kent referred to
"the statutory demolition of the system of trusts." 26 Many would as-
sume Kent to have a conservative bias, but sympathetic sitting judges
said the same. In the first high court case to deal with these provisions,
Chief Justice Savage refers to the express abolition of all expectant es-
tates, uses and trusts and that the revisers and the legislature intended to
effect "great and radical changes." 27 In the course of delivering his
opinion in Hawley v. James, one of the most important early cases ap-
plying the new statutory scheme, Judge Bronson wrote,
To give effect to the statute in the spirit in which it was en-
acted, we must, as far as practicable, eradicate from our minds
all that we have learned in relation to the doctrine of trusts as
they existed before the late revision, and read the statute as
though the particular kinds of express trusts which it specifies
were now for the first time authorised by law. We may resort
to the common law for definitions and rules of construction
where the statute itself is deficient. But in attempting to ascer-
tain whether any particular trust can now be created, we can-
not resort to the common law, for the obvious reason that this
light has been extinguished by the legislature.28
The view of a more modem commentator is similar. As George Can-
field put it in the Columbia Law Review in 1901, "The revisers under-
took to abolish the old law of uses and trusts of real property and to
establish a brand-new system, simple and intelligible after a few days'
study." 29 In the standard study of the American codification movement,
Walter Cook describes the revisers' work in this area as striking "at the
25 The "statutory spendthrift" label is not accurate. Section 57 made the income
from the trust property "beyond the sum that may be necessary for the education and
support of the person for whose benefit the trust is created" liable to pay the benefici-
ary's debts. The substance of the section appears today in N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS
LAW § 7-3.4 (McKinney 2017).
26 KEr, supra note 9, at 310.
27 Coster v. Lorillard, 14 Wend. 265, 298 (N.Y. 1835).
28 Hawley v. James, 16 Wend. 61 (N.Y. 1836) (involving the will of Henry James, the
grandfather of the psychologist William James and the novelist Henry James).
29 George F. Canfield, The New York Revised Statutes and the Rule Against Perpetu-
ities, 1 COLUM. L REv. 224, 477 (1901).
286 [Vol. 42:279
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very roots of the common law." 30 All in all this was radical reform.
And it was radical reform that was put into practice.
III. COSTER V. LORILLARD
A. George Lorillard's Estate Plan
The first important case dealing with these provisions decided by
the highest court of New York, the Court for the Correction of Errors,
was Coster v. Lorillard in 1835.31 The case involved the validity of the
trusts created under the will of George Lorillard who died in 1832 leav-
ing an estate worth approximately $3,000,000 and producing an annual
income of $80,000 to $100,000. The total value of the estate represented
economic power equal to more than $54.4 billion in 2015 and the buying
power of the annual income in 2016 dollars was between $2,280,000 and
$2,860,000 although as a share of per capita GDP, which is regarded as a
better measure of standard of living, the income was worth about
$68,000,000 a year. This was a fortune. 32
George Lorillard was one of the sons of Pierre Lorillard, the
founder of the tobacco company that bore his name for more than two
centuries, and Catherine Moore. 33 According to the reports of the cases
dealing with his will, he had three brothers: Jacob and Peter, who sur-
vived him, and Blaze (spelled "Blaze" in the transcription of the codicil)
who predeceased him, leaving a daughter, Maria Barstow, who survived
George, and two grandchildren, children of a deceased son of Blaze,
George and Blaze Lorillard. George was also survived by two children
of his mother's second marriage to Daniel Holsman, a half-sister, Cathe-
rine, wife of John Coster, and a half-brother, Daniel Holsman. The two
living brothers, the niece and grand-nephews, his half siblings, and his
mother were his heirs-at-law. His mother, however, died only a few
30 COOK, supra note 12, at 149. The term "common law of trusts" is not strictly
accurate. Trusts are the creatures of equity and "common law" refers to the law created
and applied by the English law courts as opposed to equitable principles that made up the
jurisprudence of the Court of Chancery. Yet the nineteenth century lawyers, judges, and
commentator who dealt with the Revised Statutes regularly referred to the common law
of trusts in ways that show it was unexceptional. It may be that in the legal culture of the
antebellum United States the term "common law" encompassed all of the legal rules and
precedents "received" from English law.
31 14 Wend. 265.
32 See MEASURING WORTH, https://www.measuringworth.com/ (last visited July 3,
2017).
33 In 2014 the company agreed to be purchased by Reynolds American. The com-
pany long before had passed out of the family's control. See Michael J. De La Merced &
Chad Ray, To Compete With Altria, Reynolds American Is Buying Lorillard, N.Y. Tiims,
July 15, 2014, https://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/07/15/reynolds-american-to-buy-loril
lard-for-27-4-billion/?_php=true&_type=blogs&_r=1.
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days after George's death in September of 1832. George and his
brother Peter (or Pierre) succeed to their father's tobacco business and
we could say they certainly made a go of it, given the value of George's
estate.
The basic plan was straightforward.34 Unmarried and childless,
Lorillard wanted to benefit his twelve nieces and nephews of the full
blood during their lives and then to have the property pass to their de-
scendants. The will creates two trusts. The first is to hold all the testa-
tor's real estate in New York City and from the rents and profits to pay
two charitable legacies, annuities to a half-brother, to children of his
full-blood nieces and nephews, and to his half-blood nieces and neph-
ews, and the remainder of the income in equal shares to his twelve full-
blood nieces and nephews (who were also named executors and trust-
ees). After the death of the last to die of the twelve nieces and nephews
the trust property is to be distributed to their then living descendants.35
The second trust is to be funded by selling all of the rest of his real and
personal property and investing the proceeds in real estate in New York
City, with the rents and profits to be paid to the twelve nieces and neph-
ews for their lives, with the same remainder as the first trust.36 George
Lorillard's nieces and nephews and their families were going to be filthy
rich, although their parents, Lorillard's siblings, were skipped over. In
addition the trustees would presumably be people of great influence in
New York City real estate circles, although we might wonder how well
twelve people would cooperate in the management of extensive real es-
tate holdings. The question before the court was the effect of the provi-
sions of the Revised Statutes discussed above on the trusts created in
the will.
The question remains, however, why did George Lorillard adopt
this particular estate plan? Passing property to the next generation is
not at all unusual, of course, and since George Lorillard had no spouse
or children, his decision to benefit his siblings' descendants while giving
something to his half siblings and making some charitable gifts is not at
all surprising. George was the co-owner of a profitable business, but his
plans do not appear to be at all related to ensuring that the next genera-
tion succeed to control of the enterprise.37 P&G Lorillard was almost
34 The following is drawn from the transcription of the will and codicil in the court
records accessed through Ancestry.com [hereinafter Will and Codicil] (on file with au-
thor). The provisions of the instruments are also summarized in the three opinions in the
case. See Coster, 14 Wend. at 265-72.
35 Will, Article First.
36 Will, Article Second.
37 The date of the senior Lorillard's death is uncertain, although there is a persistent
story that he was killed by the British during the occupation of New York City, a story
repeated by the New York City Parks Department, see Belmont Playground, N.Y. Crry
[Vol. 42:279288
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certainly not a corporation and was more likely a partnership, whether
formal or not. There were no shares of stock to give to the next genera-
tion, but even if there were the command in the will that his personal
property and real property situated outside the City of New York be
sold and the proceeds invested real estate in the City means that no
matter how George owned his share of the family business it would not
be part of the property held by his trustees. Even the snuff mill where
the company carried out its manufacturing operations was at that time
located in a part of Westchester County that would become part of the
City of New York only much later in the nineteenth century.38
Even more interesting is the lack of a role for his brother and busi-
ness partner Peter in George's plans. His other surviving brother, Ja-
cob, was named executor and trustee along with the twelve nieces and
nephews of the whole blood. Jacob does not appear to have been active
in the family business, but was a tanner, and apparently as successful in
turning hide into leather as his brothers were in turning tobacco into
snuff and other products.3 9 He was also closely associated with the
Mechanics' Bank "which, while its president, he twice delivered from
serious embarrassment." 4 0 A prominent abolitionist, his death was
marked by a laudatory editorial in the Colored American of September
29, 1838 which described him as being "in principle, a true abolitionist"
and as "the now sainted Lorillard."41 Perhaps George intended his
nieces and nephews to use the wealth he left him to be more like his
brother Jacob, less active in "trade" and more in philanthropic activities.
It is also possible that George's death was not unexpected and that he
DEP'T OF PARKS & RECREATION, http://www.nycgovparks.org/parks/belmont-playground
_bronx/history (last visited July 3, 2017) and EDWIN G. BURROWS & MIKE WALLACE,
GOTHAM: A HISTORY OF NEW YORK CITY TO 1898, at 345 (1999).
38 One of the landmarks in the early history of Lorillard the business was the
purchase in 1792 of a mill and the surrounding land in what is now the Bronx. See MAX-
WELL Fox, THE LORILLARD STORY 22 (1947). According to Fox, the father and sons
made the decision together, despite the book including a reproduction of what Fox iden-
tifies as the earliest known advertisement for the firm dated May 27, 1789 which men-
tions "Tobacco & Snuff" for sale "at the Manufactory, No. 4, Chatham street [today's
Park Row], near the Gaol" by Peter and George Lorillard. Id. at 4. The site of the mill,
replaced in 1870 by a stone structure which still stands, is part of the New York City park
system, the Belmont Playground, named for the Lorillard family estate that once encom-
passed the site. See Belmont Playground, supra note 37. Whether or not George held
any interest in the mill and the surrounding real estate, the direction to sell his real estate
outside of New York City would have required the sale of his interest in the mill.
39 BURROWS & WALLACE, supra note 37, at 345.
40 Jacob Lorillard, VIRTUAL AMERICAN BIOGRAPHIES, http://www.famousameri
cans.net/jacoblorillard/ (last visited July 3, 2017).
41 Colored American: A Good Man Gone to His Rest, COLORED AMERICAN (Sept.
29, 1838), http://research.udmercy.edu/find/special collections/digitallbaa/item.phpre
cordid=493&collectionCode=baa (last visited July 3, 2017).
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had already disengaged from an active role in the business. His will was
made in October 1831, eleven months before his death, and it may be
that he was already terminally ill and had indeed withdrawn from active
life. On the other hand, in the exordium of his will George described
himself as "tobacco manufacturer" and as will see very shortly, at the
time he committed his estate plan to writing George Lorillard still
owned an interest in the snuff mill that was an important part of the
family business.
It is equally possible that George intended no slight to Peter. Peter
may have been so deeply involved in running the family business that he
would not have the time to deal with the real estate portfolio the trusts
would hold, and Jacob appears to have been quite familiar with real
estate investing. Note, too, that Jacob and George, along with the hus-
band of their half-sister Catherine, John Coster, were the nominated ex-
ecutors of their mother's will. 4 2 The family may have relied on Peter to
run the business while the other men of the elder generation, whether
related by blood or marriage, were relied on to deal with the family's
investments. Finally, George Lorillard may have shared at least to some
degree his brother Jacob's views on slavery and abolition.
The only charitable gifts in George's will were $20,000 to the trust-
ees of the General Theological Seminary of the Protestant Episcopal
Church and $1000 to "the trustees or Vestry of St. Philips Church (front-
ing on Centre Street in the Sixth Ward of the City of New York)." 43 St.
Philips Church was founded at the beginning of the nineteenth century
and is the oldest historically black Episcopal parish in New York. Ac-
cording to a late nineteenth century sermon on the history of the parish,
George Lorillard leased the land to the parish on which its first church
building was erected in 1818-1819 and consecrated on July 3, 1819.44
The first rector of St. Philip's, Peter Williams, Jr., the only rector during
George Lorillard's lifetime, was one of the pillars of the American Anti-
Slavery Society, and although he was forced to resign by the then
42 Coster v. Lorillard, 14 Wend. 265, 272-73 (N.Y. 1835).
43 Will, Article First.
44 B.F. De Costa, Three Score and Ten: The Story of St. Philip's Church (1889),
http://anglicanhistory.orglusa/misc/decosta-philipl889.html (last visited July 17, 2017).
That first church building burned in December 1821 and it successor was destroyed dur-
ing anti-black and anti-abolitionist riots in July 1834. BuRRows & WALLACE, supra note
37, at 558. After several intermediate moves, the parish moved to its current location at
204 W. 134th St. in 1909. St. Philip's Episcopal Church (Manhattan), WIKIPEDIA (Nov. 29,
2016, 4;50 AM), https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/St._Philip%27sEpiscopal-Church (Man-
hattan) (last visited July 17, 2017).
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Bishop of New York, Benjamin Onderdonk, he never surrendered his
principles. 45
Whatever led George Lorillard to write the will he executed in Oc-
tober of 1831, the codicil to the will executed in December of the same
year and also admitted to probate changed his estate plan in ways that
more clearly benefitted his relatives, especially Peter Lorillard's son Pe-
ter, Jr. By the terms of the codicil, Uncle George gave Peter, Jr. "his
heirs and assigns forever, in fee simple, all my one half part of the lands
and snuff mills belonging to me and my brother Peter Lorillard" as well
as George's half interest in other lands outside of New York City owned
by him and Peter, Sr. as well as George's "part of the lands and mill
site" in Patterson, New Jersey. The gift to Peter, Jr. also included
George's house on Chatham Street (now Park Row) in Manhattan and
the leasehold lot of ground on which it stood. Whatever George Loril-
lard expected to be the outcome of the direction in his will to sell his
land outside of the City of New York, two months later the codicil made
it clear that his share of the real estate involved in the family business,
along with his house located on the same street as the company's store,
would belong to his brother and partner's eldest son. The devises in the
codicil were made conditional on Peter Jr's. paying to the executors and
trustees of the will $25,000 within two years of his uncle's death.4 6 That
payment would then become part of the trust created by Article Second
of the will and benefitting all of George's nieces and nephews ("the Ar-
ticle Second trust"). Peter, Jr. also had to agree to pay an annuity of
$200 a year for ten years to one of George's maternal cousins. Should
Peter, Jr. not agree to make the $25,000 payment and to pay the annuity,
the codicil directs the executors to sell the lands involved and to add the
proceeds to the Article Second trust.47
45 BURROWS & WALLACE, supra note 37, at 559. Rev. Williams' father, Peter Wil-
liams, Sr., was born into slavery and was purchased by tobacco merchant James Aymar.
The elder Williams, who bought his freedom after the Revolution, became an expert
cigar maker and an important figure in the Methodist church in New York while main-
taining a successful tobacco business. Id. at 398. Whether the tobacco business is part of
the link between George and Jacob Lorillard, the Williamses father and son and black
religious institutions in New York is a question that is worth further investigation. There
is little doubt that at least some of the tobacco P&G Lorillard and Company turned into
snuff and other products was raised by slave labor in the United States-Peter and
George were involved in litigation over the failure to deliver to New York tobacco they
had purchased in Virginia, a failure caused by the British blockade of Chesapeake Bay
during the War of 1812. See P&G Lorillard v. Palmer, 15 Johns. 14 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1818),
rev'd, Palmer v. Lorillard, 16 Johns. 348 (N.Y. 1819).
46 Using the relative share of GDP measure referred to supra note 32, $25,000 in
1831 is equivalent to $429 million in 2015. See MEASURING WORTH, https://www.measur
ingworth.com/.
47 Codicil, Article First.
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The codicil also disposed of other real estate outside of the City of
New York that the will had directed the executors to sell. A grand-
nephew, grandson of George's deceased brother Blaze and also named
George, received a life estate in a farm in Westchester County. After
the life tenant's death the land is to be sold and the proceeds added to
the trust created by the will.48 The same grandnephew was given fee
simple ownership of 506 acres of land in Oswego County.49 Another of
Blaze Lorillard's grandsons, also named Blaze, received a life estate in a
farm in the town of Pelham in Westchester County and fee simple own-
ership of another tract of land in Oswego County of 472 acres. The land
subject to Blaze's life estate is to be sold after his death and the pro-
ceeds added to the trust created in the will.50 Article Sixth gave
George's niece Eleanora Spencer, Peter, Sr.'s, daughter, "all my horses,
cattle, waggons [sic.], and all my farming utensils that are used upon my
farm and all my household furniture, beds, bedding and books." Under
Article Seventh, George's niece Maria Barstow, Blaze's daughter, re-
ceived a life estate in two farms in Westchester County "at present
under the care of Robert Barstow," presumably her husband, and a life
estate in lands and mills in Westchester "at present leased to Robert
Barstow." As with the lands in which his grandnephews were given life
estates, the lands Maria was to enjoy for life were to be sold after the
life tenant's death and the proceeds added to the Article Second trust.
The codicil also modified the interests in the trusts of his niece Ma-
ria Barstow and his nephew Jacob Lorillard, Jr. "[O]ne-half part of the
share or proportion of the rents, income and profits of [George's] es-
tate" that would otherwise have been paid to Maria during the seven
years after George's death is to be invested by the trustees in a separate
fund and the trustees are to pay or apply the property in their discretion
to or for the use of Maria's children.5 1 During the same seven year pe-
riod, the entire share of same rents, income and profits that would have
been paid to George's nephew Jacob, his brother Jacob's son, is to be set
aside by the trustees as a separate fund.to be paid to Jacob or applied to
the use of his children. Jacob may not have had children at the time the
codicil was executed-the provision provides that if he has no children
or if his children die "without such money having been applied to their
use," the trustees are given authority to distribute it to Jacob or to di-
vide it among his then surviving sisters.5 2 Finally, the codicil gave annui-
ties of $500 to the sons of his half-brother Daniel Holsman (his
48 Codicil, Article Second.
49 Codicil, Article Third.
50 Codicil, Articles Fourth and Fifth.
51 Codicil, Article Eighth.
52 Codicil, Article Ninth
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daughters received identical annuities in the will) to be paid out of the
Article First trust.53 The only relative completely left out was George's
half-sister Catherine, married to John Coster. Whatever the motivation
for the codicil, it expands the pool of those benefitting immediately
from the Article First trust, the source of all of the annuities, and devises
fee simple ownership of real property outside of New York City to male
members of the next generation, and perhaps most importantly gives
Peter Lorillard, Jr. the opportunity to purchase land critical to the func-
tioning of the family business. In addition, some of the George's nieces
receive life estates in real estate located outside of New York City, real
estate that would have been sold under the provisions of the will and
added to the Article Second trust. We can only speculate to what de-
gree the changes wrought by the codicil were deigned to prevent opposi-
tion to the estate plan.
While much of the "why" is speculation, one thing is certain. When
considered in the abstract, the trusts created by George Lorillard's will
were not exactly the sort of trusts the Revisers intended to destroy, or
rather, they did not exhibit the vices the new statutes were designed to
suppress. For the Revisers, and presumably for the legislators who
made the Revised Statutes the law of New York, trusts were dangerous
to the polity because they created a class of rentiers who had not re-
sponsibility for the management of the property which supported them.
This aspect of the new trust law is examined in the discussion of the
opinions of the judges in the Court of Errors. The trusts under George
Lorillard's will, however, were to be managed by the beneficiaries who
were also the trustees. With the exception of the annuitants whose an-
nuities were charges on the trust created with the real property in New
York City George owned at death, the persons who would benefit from
the income generated by the real estate held in the trusts were the same
people who would hold title to the real estate and be responsible for the
leases and other transactions that would make the property productive
of income. Some of his nieces and nephews were adults. Perhaps Uncle
George wanted to give them responsibility for their own financial secur-
ity as well as requiring them to work together to manage his share of the
53 Codicil, Article Tenth. See MEASURING WORTH, https://www.measuringworth.
com/ (last visited July 3, 2017). Using this calculator figured that a share of per capita
GDP is the equivalent of $340,000 in 2015 dollars. Therefore the $500 annuity was not
insubstantial.
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family fortune.54 In addition, his nieces, should they marry, would have
a source of income free from the control of their husbands.55
Again, some qualification is necessary. It is possible, even likely,
that the management of the Lorillard family real estate holdings in-
volved agents and others whose only relationship with the owners of the
real estate was that of employer and employee rather than a family rela-
tionship.5 6 And, as we will see, the fact that the trustees who were also
the beneficiaries were capable of managing these extensive real estate
investments was seen as one more reason why the trusts violated the
new statutes. Finally, there were no doubt practical reasons for placing
the real estate in trust rather than parceling it out in fee simple owner-
ship to the trust beneficiaries. Splitting up George's existing real estate
would likely require dividing existing plots as well as valuing them accu-
rately so that each beneficiary under the will received appropriate value.
What was once a portfolio of real estate investments managed as a
whole would become separate holdings. Instead of the intended benefi-
ciaries sharing in a large pool of income producing property, the benefit
any one beneficiary received from Uncle George's estate would depend
both on which parcels they received and how well their individual prop-
erty was managed. His nieces' property would also come under control
of their present or future husbands unless individual trusts were created
for them. Numerous relatively small trusts with a single investment
each might not have appealed to George Lorillard. His desire to give
annuities to some of his family members was also made much easier to
accomplish by creating a large trust, income from which would fund the
annuities easily. The will provision directing the sale of his personal
property would still operate but the executors would have to distribute
cash to the beneficiaries and it does seem that George Lorillard really
did prefer long term investments to be in real estate.
54 Coster, 14 Wend. at 271. George Lorillard realized that not all of his nieces and
nephews would necessarily be adults at the time of his death; the will authorized a mini-
mum of three executors and trustees who were not minors or non-residents of New York
to execute the trusts, and at his death eight of the twelve trust beneficiaries and nomi-
nated executors and trustees were of full age. Id. at 272.
55 The terms of both trusts expressly provided that the interests of the nieces and
grand-nieces who were current and remainder beneficiaries of the trusts would be paid to
them for their separate use and benefit, free from "the control, liabilities or engagements
of their husbands." Will, Article First. Such provisions were effective under New York
law both before and after the Revised Statutes. See NORMA BASCH, IN THE EYES OF THE
LAW: WOMEN, MARRIAGE AND PROPERTY IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY NEW YORK 76
(1982).
56 The devises of real estate in the Codicil often include the name of a lease or the
name of the person who has the "care" of the land.
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Whatever the reasons George Lorillard had for making the will he
did, it was all for naught. The entire arrangement was torn down by the
trust provisions of the Revised Statutes.
B. The Litigation
The case began as a bill in chancery brought by Jacob as executor
and trustee as well as executor of his mother's will (if the will were inva-
lid part of George's property would pass to his mother as one of his
heirs) and by seven of the nieces and nephews named as executors and
trustees asking for a decree from the Chancery Court stating that the
trusts in the will were valid and ordering them to be carried out. The
eighth niece who was of age refused to join in the suit and she, the mi-
nors named as executors and trustees, John Coster and his wife
(George's half-sister Catherine), Peter Lorillard, George's brother,
George's half-brother Daniel Holsman, and George and Blaze Lorillard
(George's grand-nephews, the children of a predeceased child of his pre-
deceased brother Blaze) were named as defendants. The defendants are
all persons who are George's heirs in intestacy and they may also have
been beneficiaries of George's mother's will and thus would take
through her will whatever she received as George's heir. In addition,
George's niece Maria Barstow, the daughter of his predeceased brother
Blaze and his grandnephews George and Blaze were heirs in their own
right and presumably preferred to see the trusts fail. The infant trustees
and executors, of course, could not join in the action to have the will
construed and the trusts held valid, but they would have to be bound by
any final decree and apparently under the existing procedural system
they would have to be defendants, even though their interests were al-
igned with their adult siblings and cousins and with Jacob. Peter Loril-
lard was also a defendant, but again, even if he wanted his brother's will
to be carried out as written he had no standing to bring an action to
have it declared valid but had to be bound by any decree so holding and
was therefore nominally a defendant.
The case was tried twice: once before the Vice-Chancellor57 and
again on appeal before the Chancellor who upheld the validity of part of
the income interests in the twelve nieces and nephews.58 The legal rea-
soning is complex, but the basic holding was that, first, the prohibition
on undue suspension of the power of alienation and the voiding of fu-
ture estates that caused a prohibited suspension did not apply to present
interests like the income interests in the trusts under George's will and,
second, that nothing in the Revised Statutes prevented the creation of a
57 Lorillard v. Coster, 5 Paige Ch. 172, 173 (N.Y. Ch. 1835).
58 Coster, 14 Wend, at 272.
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trust for any number of beneficiaries who have a present interest.59 The
Vice-Chancellor did express his opinion in dicta that the remainders in
the trusts under the will were invalid because they would vest only after
the death of the last of the twelve nieces and nephews 60 and therefore
suspended the power of alienation for more than two lives.
The Vice-Chancellor's decision was appealed to the Chancellor,
Reuben Walworth.61 The Chancellor was no friend of the perpetuation
of inherited fortunes. His opinion on the appeal leaves no doubt where
he stands. "The present case," he wrote, "is a striking illustration of the
wisdom of these restrictions upon the power of rendering real property
inalienable for a long period of time." 62 George Lorillard's trusts would
prevent the divisions of the real property they held for many decades
and in the meantime to give to a few of the nephews and
nieces, who may chance to live the longest, an enormous and
constantly increasing income; while the descendants, not in
esse at the death of the testator, of such of the nephews and
nieces as happen to die first, will be left without a shilling out
of the proceeds of this immense estate for their education and
support, during the continuance of the trust, although pre-
sumptively entitled to a large share of the property after the
death of the whole of the twelve nephews and nieces.63
Even more striking was Walworth's strong statement of the primacy
of society over the individual's desire to control property after death.
Nothing can be more repugnant to the principles of a republi-
can government than the perpetuation of large and overgrown
estates, long after those, by whose industry and prudence such
estates have been acquired, have been laid in their graves. ...
The natural right, however, of disposing of, as well as enjoying
all earthly possessions, necessarily terminates with our lives.
And whatever power of disposition or control we are permit-
ted, by anticipation, to exercise over our acquisitions after that
time, is merely a favor conferred upon us by some positive reg-
ulation of society. No one, therefore, should be encouraged, or
even allowed, to make an unnatural and capricious disposition
of his property by will, without regard to the situation and
probable wants of those who are the proper objects of his
bounty, for the mere purpose of rendering such property indi-
59 Lorillard, 5 Paige Ch. at 225-26.
60 Id. at 210.
61 See id. at 172.
62 Id. at 224.
63 Id.
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visible and inalienable for a long period after his death; be-
cause such a disposition of his property, by will, is a serious
injury to the community, which has granted to him the privi-
lege of disposing of the accumulations of his life in this
manner.M
One might assume at this point that the Vice-Chancellor would be re-
versed, and indeed he was, but not in a way that destroyed the trusts and
reduced George's estate to intestacy. 65 The Chancellor had a different
idea. He analyzed the income beneficiaries' interests in the two trusts as
tenancies in common with cross remainders. That meant that when the
first niece or nephew died, the remaining eleven would enjoy one-elev-
enth of the decedent's share of the income of the trust." When the next
beneficiary died the trust must end because then the two-life permissible
period of suspension of the power of alienation would be at an end.
Presumably at that time the trust property would pass to George's heirs
because the will made no other disposition of the property other than to
the trusts.
This result, of course, made no one completely happy, and the
Chancellor's decision was appealed to the Court of Errors of the State
of New York.67 The Court of Errors was the highest court of the state
until the Constitution of 1846 abolished it and created instead the Court
of Appeals, still the highest court of New York. The Court of Errors
was unusual among the highest courts of the states in its membership. It
was composed of the president of the state senate, the senators, the
chancellor, and the judges of the Supreme Court.68
The high court decided that the new rules completely destroyed
George Lorillard's estate plan. There were five opinions in the Court of
Errors. All agreed that under the English common law, indeed under
the law of New York as it stood before the Revised Statutes, the trusts
in the will were completely valid and indeed unexceptional. 69 The clas-
sic rule against perpetuities was not violated. The remainders following
the nieces' and nephews' interest in the income of the trusts are not
vested during the existence of the income interest because the takers of
the trust have to be living at the death of the last of the twelve to die,
but when all of the twelve are dead, the trust property will be distrib-
6 Id. at 225.
65 See id.
66 Id. at 230.
67 Coster v. Lorillard, 14 Wend. 265, 278 (N.Y. 1835).
68 5 AMERICAN CHARTERS, CONSTITUTIONS AND ORGANIC LAWS 2646 (F. Thorpe,
ed. 1909). See FRANCIS BERGAN, HISTORY OF THE NEW YORK COURT OF APPEALS 1847-
1932 at 9, 12-14, 19-35 (1985).
69 Coster, 14 Wend. at 369.
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uted to their descendants. The vesting is delayed only for the lives of
the twelve and since they were all living at their uncle's death all is well.
But under the Revised Statutes all is not well. There was much
discussion about the application of the provisions of sections 14 and 15
to trusts. One of the arguments made to uphold the trusts was that the
language voiding every "future estate" meant that only future estates,
the name the new statutes gave to future interests, the existence of
which suspended the power of alienation, were void. The court held,
however, that the statute subjected every interest in the trusts it permit-
ted to the suspension rule.70 The life income interests therefore violated
the rule. Because the interests of the twelve as beneficiaries are inalien-
able under section 63 and because as trustees they cannot alienate so as
to destroy the trusts-to do so would violate their duty as trustees to
administer the trusts according to their terms and therefore be com-
pletely void under section 65 as an action in contravention of the trust-
the power to alienate is suspended for all twelve lives and the statute is
violated.
In addition, a majority of the court held that the trust itself was
invalid because it was not one of the four varieties authorized in section
55.71 The only authorized trust that could encompass the Lorillard
trusts was the third, a trust to "to receive the rents and profits of lands
and apply them to the use of any person during the life of such per-
son." 72 As originally submitted by the revisers to the legislature, the
rents and profits were to be applied "to the education and support, or
support only of any persons." 7 3 In the course of legislative debate the
section was amended and as passed allowed application of the rents and
profits for "The education and support, or either" of any person.7 4
Some three months after passage, in 1830, the language defining the
third type of trust was amended again and the word "use" was substi-
tuted for the phrase referring to education and support.75 The five
judges of the Court of Errors who authored opinions were not of one
mind on the meaning of the provision.
Chief Justice Savage clearly believed that section 45 of the Revised
Statutes meant what it said: "Uses and trusts, except as authorized and
modified in this Article, are abolished." 76 He cited the notes of the re-
visers in which they stated that the purpose of the provision in section 55
70 Id. at 266.
71 Id. at 386.
72 Id. at 318.
73 Id. at 321.
74 Id.
75 Id. at 265.
76 R.S. § 45.
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limiting express trusts of real estate to the four categories enumerated
above was to allow the creation of trusts only where the trustees must
necessarily have both the title to the real estate and possession of it.
The revisers judged trusts in which the beneficiaries have an interest in
the lands held in trust to be pernicious. Such trusts complicate title to
land, create unnecessary law suits, and impair the alienability of land.
The revisers concluded that only trusts in which the trustees had real,
active duties to perform should be allowed and that beneficiaries should
have only the right to enforce the trust; they should not have an interest
in the trust property itself.77 In the Chief Justice's view, the revisers
clearly believed that trusts in the third category, "to receive the rents
and profits of lands" and apply them to the education or support of any
person were generally created to provide for the education of a minor,
to provide a married woman with an income outside of the control of
her husband, or for the support of "a lunatic or spendthrift."7 8
The Chief Justice was confident that the subsequent action of the
legislature in removing the reference to education or support and re-
placing it with "use" did not expand the classes of persons for whom
such trusts could be created.79 Nor did replacement of "education or
support" with the word "use" sanction the creation of a trust like the
trusts in the Lorillard will which are supposed to collect the rents from
the real property and simply pay over what is left after paying the annui-
ties to the twelve nieces and nephews.80 First, a trust to receive the
rents and profits of real estate and to pay them over to beneficiaries was
"known at common law, and was of course abolished with all other
trusts."8 1 Second, the Legislature's substitution of the phrase "apply to
the use of" 8 2 must be understood in the context of the revisers' reasons
for limiting the sorts of express trusts that can be created. The common
law trust to receive and pay over rents and profits of real estate gave the
beneficiaries of the trust an interest in the real estate. That is exactly
the situation the revisers sought to eliminate from the law of New
York.83
Senator Maison also held the Lorillard trust to be outside of the
bounds erected by the Revised Statutes. He agreed with Chief Justice
Savage that the Legislature intended to limit the creation of trusts of
real estate to receive and pay over rents and profits to those situations in
77 Coster v. Lorillard, 14 Wend. 265, 322-23 (N.Y. 1835).
78 Id. at 321.
79 Id. at 321-22.
80 Id. at 321.
81 Id. at 322.
82 Id.
83 Id. at 322.
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which the beneficiaries are incapable of caring for themselves. 8 4 The
provision in section 63 forbidding a beneficiary from transferring his or
her beneficial interest in the trust was an integral part of the scheme
designed to insure that the beneficiaries could not lose the protection
given them by the creator of the trust.8 5 In addition, it was abundantly
clear that George Lorillard's twelve nieces and nephews were not the
sort of persons for whom trusts could be created. Far from being inca-
pable of caring for themselves, they were to be their own trustees. It
would be their responsibility to manage a vast fortune. The conclusion
was obvious: "This trust is not, then, in this view of it, such a trust as was
designed to be authorized by the statute." 86
Senator Young was even more adamant about the nature of the
beneficiaries of the trusts authorized by the third clause of section 55:
What class of individuals need the aid of trustees to deal out to
them, from time to time, for their support for life or a shorter
term, or in other words, to apply to their use the rents and
profits of land? The greatest part of mankind would feel them-
selves degraded by being placed in such a situation; by being
excluded from all control over property. . . . It is apparent,
then, that it was not intended by the Legislature that trusts of
this description should be create to subserve the ordinary
wants of the community."8 7
The persons such trusts are to serve are those the revisers men-
tioned: "Persons of imbecile minds, females who have married unfortu-
nately, dissipated sons, the aged and infirm" who cannot manage
property for themselves.8 8 Young admitted that the Revised Statutes do
not require the creator of a trust to "specify the incapacity of the benefi-
ciaries for whom the trust is created." 89 The law will presume that the
beneficiaries fit the description. That presumption cannot be indulged
in this case, however. First, as Senator Maison noted, George Loril-
lard's making his nieces and nephews trustees shows that as benefi-
ciaries they "are perfectly competent to have the charge and
management of property."" In addition, the income involved is so large
that the trust "could not be designed merely for the support of the bene-
84 Id. at. 352.
85 Id. at 353.
86 Id. at 355.
87 Id. at 377-78.
88 Id. at 378.
89 Id. at 381.
90 Id.
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ficiaries." 91 His conclusion was clear: "To give effect to the trust would
be to pervert and prostrate the statute." 92
This interpretation of the word "apply" seems to be closer to the
intent of the revisers. Their report on their work was widely dissemi-
nated, and they stated quite clearly that the purpose of the third type of
trust was to allow the creator of the trust to care for those who could not
care for themselves-femmes covert, minors, the incapacitated and
spendthrifts. The limitation of the purposes of such trusts to education
and support fit with that aim. The question was whether the substitu-
tion of the word "use" changed the meaning. Senator Young certainly
thought not: "The only object of the statute, as has been shown, was to
authorize this trust for the benefit of those who were destitute of the
will, the discretion or the power to manage property for themselves." 93
Justice Nelson, however, believed that the Lorillard trusts were
valid under section 55.94 The substitution of "use" for "education and
support" meant that the Legislature accepted that the person creating
the trust could regulate how the trust was to be administered. In other
words, "the mode of applying the rents and profits, as well as the
amount of them" is not limited by any purpose expressed in the statute
but rather "rests in the discretion of the person creating the trust." 95
The statute allows the creation of a trust to pay over rents and profits in
any amount, including all of them, for the use of the beneficiary as the
beneficiary decides.96
Although he found the trusts to be valid under section 55, Justice
Nelson believed the trusts violated the rule against the undue suspen-
sion of the power of alienation and therefore were totally invalid.97 The
more important point is that he arrived at the conclusion that the trust
was valid under section 55 through construing the Legislature's inten-
tion as shown by the substitution of "use" for "education or support."98
He was as confident as his colleagues that the Revised Statutes created a
completely new system. "It must be remembered," he wrote, "that no
trusts now exist in the State out of this 2d article [of the Revised Stat-
utes]. . . . They are now the creature of the statute; and to be sustained
by the court, must not only be in conformity to the provisions authoriz-
ing their creation, but subject to the restrictions the statute has im-
91 Id.
92 Id.
93 Id.
94 Id. at 267.
95 Id. at 332.
96 Id.
9 Id. at 350.
98 Id. at 321.
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posed." 9 9 There simply is no other source of the law of trusts other than
the Revised Statutes.
The final member of the court to deliver an opinion was Senator
Tracy. He believed that the Lorillard trusts were clearly allowed by sec-
tion 55.100 The amendment replacing "education or support" with "use"
was intended to allow trusts which simply pay over the rents of profits of
real estate to the beneficiaries. 101 Senator Tracy was the only one of the
five members of the court writing an opinion who cast the slightest
doubt on the complete supplanting of the common law by the Revised
Statutes. He believed that it was possible to sustain the interests of the
nieces and nephews by considering the trusts as creating an interest in
one-twelfth of the income for life in each of the nieces and nephews.1 02
Such was the common law and "I should be sorry to think," he wrote,
"the Revised Statutes have made such unreasonable and mischievous
innovation upon the common law."1 03 Yet he too believed the trust vio-
lated the prohibition on suspension of the power of alienation for longer
than two lives and voted to invalidate the trusts. 1 0 4
The limitation of trusts to those purposes was again one of the radi-
cal provisions of the revised statutes. It is not surprising then that Sena-
tor Young, so certain on this subject, was the judge most direct in
praising alienability. In his view, the common law has been "molded to
allow the aggregation of wealth in the hands of an aristocracy, [by al-
lowing] exclusion from alienation in perpetuity or for long periods of
years, by remainders, trusts, uses and powers, to gratify the vanity of the
possessor and the pride of the recipient." 0 5 Those provisions, in his
view, "are regulations diametrically opposed to those principles of
equality upon which our government is founded."1 06
The legislature did the right thing in limiting trusts to those re-
quired to protect the weak, promoting their fitness for that purpose by
making the trusts destructible, and limiting their existence with the anti-
suspension rule. All these changes were clearly made because the result
of the adoption of the Revised Statutes is "that the common law, in
reference to real property, to its tenure and transmission, with all their
incidents, is wholly abolished."1 07
99 Id. at 333.
100 Id. at 393-95.
101 Id. at 394.
102 Id. at 393-95.
103 Id. at 396.
104 Id.
105 Id. at 372.
106 Id.
107 Id. at 369.
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As we have seen, not all the judges who gave opinions were as ada-
mant as Senator Young, but they all found the Revised Statutes to be
the only relevant source of law and all twenty-four members of the court
voted to reverse the decree of the Chancellor partially upholding the life
interests in the trusts because in the view of all the judges the life inter-
ests unduly suspended the power of alienation. 108 With the decision in
Coster v. Lorillard the radical nature of the Revised Statutes at least as
applied to trusts of lands was confirmed. The result was that George
Lorillard's fortune passed outright to his heirs-his surviving siblings,
the children of predeceased siblings, and through his mother's estate
perhaps to his half-siblings as well and his dream of keeping his fortune
intact for his grandnieces and nephews was frustrated, a result he could
have obtained under the common law. 109
IV. THE LEGAL SEQUEL
Within less than two decades the radicalism of the trust law embod-
ied in the Revised Statutes was greatly lessened. Application of the sus-
pension rule and the two life limit to present interests survived. Trusts
that would have been perfectly acceptable under the classic rule against
perpetuities remained void in New York, and unlike the classic rule
against the remoteness of vesting the suspension rule directly limited the
duration of a trust. After Coster a New Yorker could create a testamen-
tary trust to endure for the lives of a child and a child's child living at the
testator's death but the trust could not last through the lives of grandchil-
dren born after the testator's death as it could under the classic rule
which invalidates only the remainder vesting after the death of the last
grandchild to die. In addition, under the classic rule the invalidity of the
remainder does not affect the preceding income interests; only the re-
mainder is invalid. That means that after the death of the last of the
testator's grandchildren the trust property would most likely pass to the
estates of those persons who were the testator's intestate heirs and the
property might end up in the hands of the descendants in whom the
testator attempted to create the invalid remainder. The trust would
have endured for the lifetimes of the child and the child's children even
if some of the latter were born after the trust was created. Of course
108 Id. at 389. The provisions of the Codicil making outright devises of real estate
and creating life estates in other parcels of real estate were also held invalid because they
were so closely connected to the invalid trusts.
109 There was no disagreement, however, about the validity of the two charitable
bequests which were therefore paid to the designated recipients. In addition, the lower
court decrees finding valid the annuities charged on the Article First trust were not ap-
pealed as to all the annuities so some of them were indeed paid. Perhaps needless to say,
the arrangements for the paying of those annuities led to litigation. See Lorillard v. Loril-
lard, 4 Abb. Pr. 210, 23 Barb. 528 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1857).
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under the Revised Statutes a testator can create a trust for a married
daughter which would keep the property out of the hands of her hus-
band and give it directly to her children on her death. And even George
Lorillard could have gotten something of what he wanted had he cre-
ated separate trusts for each niece and nephew, although his fortune
would not necessarily have been administered as a single entity for all of
their lives.
Where change did come before the Civil War was in the meaning of
the word "apply" in the definition of the third type of permitted trust of
lands. The exclusion of a trust which simply pays its income to the bene-
ficiary was litigated again and again until in 1849 the still new Court of
Appeals gave a definitive answer in favor of the ability to create such
trusts.11 0 The interpretation given in Coster was the subject of much
criticism. James Kent put it succinctly:
If this construction be correct, what inconveniences have been
produced by the statutory demolition of the system of trusts?
Who would be a trustee, and be bound to look into, and judge
of, and pay all the expenditures of a married woman, or of an
absent friend, or of the aged and infirm, who stood in need of
the agency of a trustee? 1 '
The criticism was made more biting by another quirk of the Re-
vised Statutes. One of the effects of the provision which gave the trus-
tee both the legal and equitable title to the trust property and gave the
beneficiary only the right to enforce the trust in the court was that the
beneficiary could not be his or her own trustee.11 2 If that were never-
theless to happen and the trustee were also the only income beneficiary,
then the beneficiary would hold all of the interest in the trust income
and the trust would merge out of existence. Consider the parent who
wishes to create a trust for a married daughter in order to keep the
property out of the control of her husband, or the parent or other rela-
tive who wishes to create a testamentary trust for a child simply because
the inalienability of the child's interest makes it immune from creditors
at least to the extent there is no "surplus" the creditors can reach under
section 57, another delightful effect of the Revised Statutes. The re-
quirement that the trustee, who must be someone other than the benefi-
ciary, "apply" the property could be as burdensome as Kent describes it.
All the creator of the trust wished to do is to create an income stream
for the beneficiary that will be his or hers alone to control and that can-
not be reached by creditors. Perhaps it would be more difficult to find a
110 See generally Leggett v. Perkins, 2 N.Y. 297 (1849).
111 Kent, supra note 9, at 310.
112 See generally id.
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willing trustee if the job required seeing to the use of money distributed
from the trust. Indeed, the practical difficulty in finding a trustee willing
to take on the responsibilities of trusteeship under this provision is also
raised by the author of a long series of articles on codification in The
American Jurist. 113
Influenced or not by arguments addressed to practical effects, the
then new Court of Appeals changed the law by its decision in Leggett v.
Perkins in 1849.114 Gerardus Post died in 1833. His will created trusts
of one-fifth of his estate for each of his two daughters. At a daughter's
death the trust property is to pass to her "lawful issue."1 15 The trustee is
to "pay over to them [the daughters] respectively . . . the rents, interests,
or net income thereof .. . ."116 In his majority opinion, Judge Gardiner
held that the trusts were within the third subdivision of section 55.117
He came to that conclusion for several reasons, including the language
of the statute and practical difficulties of the sort alluded to by Kent.
Perhaps more significantly, he is quite clear that the enactment of the
Revised Statutes did not create the law of trusts anew:
The statute in reference to express trusts is merely permissive.
It creates nothing. We might infer from the argument ad-
dressed to us, that the legislature had in the first instance an-
nulled all trusts, and then preceded to a new creation. It is
more correct to say that they abolished all that they have not
recognized as existing. The trusts preserved have their founda-
tion in the common law, and their effect is to be determined by
the application of common law principles. . . . When a trust is
created of this nature (a trust to apply rents and profits to the
use of any person], it is recognized as existing with all its com-
mon law incidents. The relation of the donor and trustee, the
power of the former and the duty of the latter, are precisely
what they were by the common law.' 18
Under the common law the donor may define the trustee's duties and
that includes the ability to direct the trustee to pay over the trust income
to the beneficiary. The statute, according to Gardiner, "says nothing of
the discretion of the trustee; it speaks only of the power of the creator of
113 Luther S. Cushing, Codification and Reform of the Law, AMER. JURIST & L., Oct.
1839 - Feb. 1840, at 368.
114 2 N.Y. 297.
115 Id.
116 Id. at 305.
117 Id. at 324.
118 Id. at 307.
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the trust."119 The statute does not compel the creator to rely on the
discretion of the trustee.
Gardiner goes on to construe the words of the statute, in particular
"apply," insisting that it means simply to give the income of the trust to
the beneficiary and does not necessarily imply that the trustee must
have discretion in deciding how much of the income is to be distrib-
uted.1 20 But most significant is Judge Gardiner's answer to the argu-
ment that a trust in which the trustee must simply pay over the rents and
profits of the real property held in trust is the sort of "formal" trust
which the revisers were determined to destroy because it was merely a
way of masking the trust ownership of real property. 12 1 In the Coster
case Chief Justice Savage stated that a trust to "receive and pay over"
the rents and profit of realty was exactly the sort of formal trust the
revisers wished to end and supported his argument by noting that such a
trust was perfectly permissible under the common law but was "abol-
ished" with all other common law trusts.1 22 According to Judge Gar-
diner, such a trust "is essentially active in all its particulars. It was so at
the common law, and is so now."1 23 In other words, it could not fall
under the Statute of Uses and be "executed" out of existence. Gar-
diner's conclusion is all the more significant because the Revised Stat-
utes enacted its own version of the Statute of Uses as sections 47 and 49:
Section 47. Every person, who, by virtue of any grant, assign-
ment or devise, now is, or hereafter shall be entitled to the
actual possession of lands, and the receipt of the rents and
profits thereof, in law or in equity, shall be deemed to have a
legal estate therein, of the same quality and duration and sub-
ject to the same conditions, as his beneficial interest.124
Section 49. Every disposition of lands, whether by deed or de-
vise hereafter made, shall be directly to the person in whom
the right to the possession and profits, shall be intended to be
invested, and not to any other, to the use of, or in trust for,
such person; and if made to one or more persons, to the use of,
119 Id. at 308.
120 Id. at 309.
121 Id. at 311.
122 Coster v. Lorillard, 14 Wend. 265, 322 (N.Y. 1835).
123 Leggett v. Perkins, 2 N.Y. 297, 314 (1849).
124 Section 47 remained in the New York statutes until 1997 when its descendant,
N.Y. Estates Powers & Trusts Law section 7-1.1, was repealed and a new section 7-1.1
enacted bringing the law of New York on the merger of interests held in trust into con-
formity with the overwhelming majority of United States jurisdictions. The principal ef-
fect of the old statute was to prevent an individual from being sole trustee of a trust
created for the individual's benefit. See Wetmore v. Truslow, 51 N.Y. 338 (1873).
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or in trust for, another, no estate or interest, legal or equitable,
shall vest in the trustee.125
The language of these sections seems to invalidate the sort of trust
Gardiner describes, and it certainly does when read in the context of the
trust law created by the Revised Statutes. If trusts are only to be cre-
ated to those who cannot take care of themselves, then if someone is to
have the complete enjoyment of property the property should be con-
veyed to him outright. Trustees exist only to take care of those who
cannot help themselves.
Judge Bronson dissented vigorously. The judge held firm to the
views he expressed as a member of the Court of Errors in the Hawley
case.1 26 In his view the legislature has completely abolished the com-
mon law of trusts of land, and "if the authority to make this trust cannot
be found in the statute, it does not exist."1 27 The trust created in Gerar-
dus Post's will suspends the power of alienation because the benefi-
ciaries cannot convey their interests. The Revised Statutes limit the
duration of such trust to two lives and also limit the purposes for which
trusts can be created to those situations in which outright ownership by
the beneficiary is not possible-minors, married women whose property
is controlled by their husbands, imbeciles and lunatics. In more general
terms, trusts which suspend the power of alienation are to be allowed
only where they are necessary to the protection of persons who cannot
manage wealth for themselves. In short, "it is not the policy of our law
to enable men to tie up their estates, where no valuable end is to be
attained by it."128
Even more revealing is the description of the disasters that will
come about from allowing the creation of a trust in which the trustee
must pay over the income to the beneficiary. According to Judge Bron-
son in some case simply paying over the money to the beneficiary will
not be applying it to the beneficiary's use as the statute requires:
If [the beneficiary] is a lunatic, or is spending the money in
gaming and drunkenness, while his wife and children are suf-
fering from cold and hunger, it would be a breach of the statute
125 The current version of this provision is N.Y. EsT. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 7-1.2
(McKinney 2017) which applies, as its predecessor did quite soon after its adoption, to
disposition of both real and personal property. The application of the Revised Statutes
to all trusts was accomplished by the judiciary and is a story for another day.
126 See Leggett, 2 N.Y. at 321 (Bronson, J., dissenting); Hawley v. James, 16 Wend. 61,
147-48 (N.Y. 1836) (holding that the legislature had restricted trusts to beneficiaries
under disability, or at least to cases where the trustee had discretion in applying the
income).
127 Leggett, 2 N.Y. at 323.
128 Id. at 326.
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trust to put the money in his hands. And yet under the trust
we have here, the trustee could not withhold a single dollar
and apply it himself to the relief of the suffering family.129
In addition, the Revised Statutes in section 57 allow creditors of the
beneficiary to obtain an order from the appropriate court for the pay-
ment of the sums owed them from "the surplus of such rents and profits,
beyond the sum that may be necessary for the education and support"
of the beneficiary.13 0 According to Bronson, "when the statute is fol-
lowed in making the trust," that is, when the word "apply" means that
the trustee must have discretion in using the rents and profits for the
beneficiary, "the trustee will have the right to prefer the claims of hon-
est tradesmen, mechanics and laborers, to the demands of harlots, gam-
blers, and sharpers." 131 But if the trustee must passively pay over the
rents and profits "the trustee has no such power." 132 For Judge Bron-
son, to allow the creation of a trust which would simply pay over its
income the beneficiary subverted the entire statutory scheme.
The decision in Leggett clearly limited the potentially radical effect
of the Revised Statutes on the law of trusts.133 If Judge Bronson is
taken as exemplifying the views of those who favored limitations on the
creation of trusts, then the decision in Leggett represents a triumph of
the desires of the owner of property over social limitations on the use of
property. That triumph, however, came about not through a gutting of
the statutes, but of a reading of arguably ambiguous language in the
statute. Clearly the amendment which substituted the word "use" for
"education or support" muddied the waters considerably. The most
striking aspect of Gardiner's argument, however, is the blithe assertion
that the legislature did not abolish the common law of trusts in enacting
the Revised Statutes.
V. CONCLUSION
There are many factors that can be identified as playing some part
in the Court of Appeals' opinion in Leggett. Between the decisions in
Coster and Leggett New York adopted a new constitution. Among the
most important provisions of that new frame of government was a thor-
ough reform of the state's judiciary. Not only was the Court of Errors
abolished along with all the lower courts, but the judges who staffed the
129 Id. at 325.
130 R.S. § 57.
131 Leggett v. Perkins, 2 N.Y. 297, 325 (1849).
132 Id.
133 FOWLER, supra note 13, at 144-45 (noting that the construction of section 55 in
Leggett and subsequent cases, "tolerates a species of naked or passive permanent trusts
not originally contemplated by the revisers").
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new courts were to be elected rather than appointed by the governor
with the approval of the legislature. In addition, the economy suffered
badly in the late 1830s and early 1840s.1 3 4 One of the effects of the
economic dislocation was a growing dissatisfaction with government ex-
penditures on internal improvements (in modern terms, "infrastruc-
ture") which helped to bolster, if not create, a belief in a narrow role for
government which might seem incompatible with restrictions on the dis-
position of wealth.135 Some of these events outside of the world of legal
reasoning and judging had some effect on what courts decided. Yet the
language of the opinions remains and shows that it was difficult if not
impossible to completely supplant in lawyers' minds common law con-
cepts and rules by the enactment of a comprehensive statute, a code.
There is another lesson in this one small example of the fate of a
radical abolition of common law rules and concepts and the substitution
of a code in a fundamentally common law jurisdiction. All the opinions
in both cases construe the statute; that is, the judges attempt to find the
meaning of the words, in this case "apply to the use," in section 55 and
"future estate" in sections 14 and 15, that the legislature intended. In
addition, however, the judges were concerned with policy. The mem-
bers of the Court of Errors who gave opinions in Coster all acknowl-
edged the primacy of the legislature's choice of what sorts of trusts
would be allowed under the Revised Statutes. Judge Gardiner's opinion
in Leggett, however, explicitly made a policy choice. He disagreed with
the limitation of trusts to those whose beneficiaries are not competent to
handle their own affairs. "Every one knows," he wrote, "that there are
individuals in every society, who are neither imbecile nor profligate, nor
united with those who are so, who could property dispose of fixed in-
come, and yet who ought not, from prudential reasons, to control the
capital out of which it is raised." 1 3 6
In a sense, this comment shows that the judge is substituting his
judgment for that of the legislature. This willingness on the part of
judges to understand their power as extending to substituting their pol-
icy choices for those of the legislature is an important factor in under-
standing the fate of codes in the United States. It goes hand in hand
with the reluctance to accept the legislature's power to totally abolish
the common law and rewrite the rules on a clean slate. In some ways
134 See CHARLES W. McCuRDY, THE ANTI-RENT ERA IN NEW YoR LAW AND
POLITICS, 1839-1865 at 34-35 (2001).
135 Id. at 7. The difference between New York's Democrats and Whigs in this period
as the difference between those who believed that society would naturally find its moral
balance and those who believed that government had a duty to "shape the social condi-
tion of the people."
136 Leggett, 2 N.Y. at 313-14.
Winter 2017] 309
ACTEC LAW JOURNAL
these two beliefs are connected. Throughout the nineteenth century the
common law was seen by many lawyers and judges as embodying the
total experience of society. Its rules had grown out of customary usages
(although the relationship between "custom" and "law" is a complex
one) and in some way embodied the very essence of a properly organ-
ized society. In the post-Civil War period in the United States the belief
in the connection between the common law and the proper organization
of society would become even more pronounced. 137 It was strong
enough, however, to contribute to the partial undoing of perhaps the
most heroic effort at codification attempted in the nineteenth century
United States.
137 See William P. LaPiana, Jurisprudence of History and Truth, 23 RUTGERS L. J.
519, 519-59 (1992).
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